The Breard Case and the Virtues of Forbearance by Douglass, John G.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1998
The Breard Case and the Virtues of Forbearance
John G. Douglass
University of Richmond, jdougla2@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
John G. Douglass, The Breard Case and the Virtues of Forbearance, Richmond Law, Summer 1998 at 13.
uled execution of Angel Fran-
cisco Breard made Virginia the 
focus of a groundbreaking con-
troversy over the reach of inter-
nationallaw into the domestic 
criminal process of the United 
States, law students and faculty 
at the University of Richmond 
had the unique opportunity to 
consider the case along with 
Philippe Sands, then a Visiting 
Allen Chair Professor at the Uni-
versity. Professor Sands is re-
markable not only because of 
his impressive reputation as a 
scholar in international law, 
but also because of his experi-
ence as a practitioner before 
the International Court of 
Justice which was, at that vety 
moment, wrestling with the 
Breard case1 
Like Professor Sands, I was 
troubled at Virginia's execution 
of Breard in the face of the ICJ's 
Order for Provisional measures. 
At least symbolically, the epi-
sode undermines future effot1s 
by the United States to convince 
other nations to take interna-
tionallaw seriously. If the 
United States will not- or 
cannot, under our federal sys-
tem- defer a state's irrevers-
ible action in a matter of life or 
death for a period of months at 
the request of an international 
tribunal interpreting a treaty to 
which the United States is a 
party, then we will be hard 
pressed to ask other nations to 
pay any heed to ICJ directives of 
lesser moment. 
But I do not share in many 
of Professor Sands' broader con-
cerns about the Supreme 
Court's ruling. Professor Sands 
argues that, under the Court's 
ruling, nations "are free to deter-
mine how to implement [sub-
stantive protections of interna-
tionallaw]" and that such pro-
tections "can be gutted altogether 
by limiting the [procedural] cir-
cumstances in which [an] indi-
vidual can invoke the right." 
I believe the Court's ruling is 
considerably narrower. The Court 
claimed no power to impose spe-
cial procedural limits on the 
implementation of international 
treaty rights. Instead, the Court 
ruled that such treaty rights are of 
equal dignity to rights guaranteed 
under our Constitution or by fed-
eral statute. They may be in-
voked, procedurally, in the same 
manner and subject to the same 
limitations under which a defen-
dant might invoke, for example, 
claims under the Fom1h or Fifth 
Amendments. 
Such a concept carries its 
own, rather sensible, limits. Na-
tions should be no more restric-
tive - procedurally- in en-
forcing treaty rights than they are 
in enforcing the rights of their 
own citizens under domestic law. 
To do less would, as Professor 
Sands points out, "gut" the force 
of international law. 
But to expect more, it seems 
to me, is a political impossibility. 
It seems highly unlikely that Para-
guay or any other signatory to the 
Vienna Convention believed that 
it had ceded authority to an inter-
national tribunal on othetwise 
routine matters of criminal proce-
dure. It is possible, of course, that 
nations collectively might agree 
to create "international rules of 
criminal procedure." But it does 
not appear to me that the Vienna 
Convention established any such 
rules. 
Instead, it requires only that 
"full effect ... be given to the pur-
poses for which the [treaty] rights 
... are intended." The courts of 
Virginia and the United States did 
exactly that. Unfortunately for 
Breard, he attempted to invoke 
those rights, belatedly, in a case 
where the "full effect" of such 
rights was essentially niL A con-
versation with consular officials 
would have made no difference. 
"On the merits," then, I find 
little reason to fault the Court's 
decision. What is most troubling 
to me, however, is that the inter-
national conflict engendered by 
the Breard episode was so avoid-
able. As three Supreme Court 
justices pointed out, the Court 
had discretion to stay Breard's 
execution irrespective of the ICJ 
order, simply to allow the normal 
time for considering the pending 
petitions for certiorari. 
Gov. Jim Gilmore possessed 
the power to forbear from execu-
tion, even if only for a few 
months, simply as a matter of 
deference to the ICJ or to the sec-
retary of state and the president. 
He could easily have done so 
while still maintaining that he had 
power to do otherwise. Even a 
brief delay might have given the 
ICJ time to consider the merits 
and do what international tribu-
nals ought to do: fashion an opin-
ion designed to promote treaty 
compliance without intruding too 
deeply into the domestic legal 
process 2 
Instead, as Professor Sands 
rightly concludes, Virginia's rush 
to irreversible action has thrown 
down a gauntlet which the ICJ is 
unlikely to ignore. Paraguay's 
case is still pending against the 
United States and Virginia's haste 
has diminished the prospect of a 
"diplomatic" resolution. If, as Pro-
fessor Sands suggests, the ICJ 
ultimately rules that "international 
law prevails over domestic law," 
and that the Vienna Convention 
creates "enforceable individual 
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rights to which real remedies at-
tach," then we may be headed for 
an unfortunate showdown with 
an unpredictable ending. 
Perhaps the ICJ will prove to 
be a paper tiger. Though it seems 
unlikely in the current political 
climate, perhaps Congress might 
view our international obligations 
seriously enough to implement 
the treaty with legislation that 
might expand the power of 
federal courts to review state ac-
tion in cases of alleged treaty 
violations. 
Neither result would benefit 
Virginians, who would like to 
preserve local control over the 
administration of criminal justice, 
but must compete in a global 
economy which will become in-
creasingly dependent upon the 
enforceability of international 
law. That dilemma may well arise 
during future international "trade 
missions" when Virginia's gover-
nor sits across the table from his 
counterpart in, just for example, 
Paraguay. 
Sometimes power is pre-
served most effectively through 
forbearance. John Marshall 
proved that maxim almost 200 
years ago when, by declining to 
exercise powers Congress had 
attempted to give the Court, he 
preserved for the long run the 
Court's fundamental powers of 
judicial review5 Gov. Gilmore 
would have done well to heed 
that advice. It remains to be seen 
whether the ICJ will follow 
Marshall's example. 
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1 Breard never claimed d1at he was affirmatively denied access to the Paraguyan consuL lie complained only that 
arresting authorities violated the Vienna Convention by failing to him of his right to contact the consulate. 
Apparently, neither Breard- who had been living in the United for about six years before he raped and 
murdered one of his Arlington County neighbors- nor his trial counsel gave any thought to contactirg the 
consulate before his conviction or during the process of direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The 
matter was first raised \Vhen he tiled a petition for habeas corpus in federal court. Netherland, 949 F. 
Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996), ajfd sub nom l3reard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (/f'h Cir. 1998). Federal District Court 
rejected the claim, finding that it was procedurally defaulted when Breard failed to raise it in state court and, 
further, tbatl3reard failed to show any cause or prejudice for the default. 
2 For example, the ICJ might rule, and still could mle, (1) that signatory nations may follow their own rules of 
criminal procedure as long as they '·give full effect" to the "purpose'' of the Convention, and (2) that the treaty 
violation in Breard's case had no effect on his conviction or sentence, so that the purposes of the convention were 
not frustrated in his case. 
1 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 LEd. 60 (1803). 
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